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There is no necessary relationship between the pairwise biases p(i,j) and the first choice biases Pi' although various choice theories provide for one. In particular, Luce's choice theory (1959) suggests that we ought to find for all i, j, i #j. If the S's first response is wrong, the high threshold model implies that a second choice made between the two remaining alternatives can be based only on pairwise response biases p(i,j), where p(i,j) denotes the (bias) probability of choosing Ai over A j when only these two responses are available, Thus, in the present experiment a straightforward test of the high threshold assumption can be based on the predictions P(A 1,21 Sl A 2,l) = P(A 1 ,21S3 A 2 ,l ) =p(l,3) (3) P(A 2 ,21S2 A 3,l) = P(A 2,21 8 1 A S ,I ) =p(2,l)
P(A 3 ,21 8 3 A l ,l ) =P (A 3,21 82 A 1,l) =p(3,2)
better than chance second choice performance would also appear in the Estes-Taylor task, and that consequently the class of high threshold models would be inadequate for that situation.
In the present study, there were three critical symbols, exactly one of which appeared in each stimulus. Let Sl' S2' and S3 denote the critical symbols, AI' A2' and A3 the corresponding responses, and let Ai,j denote the event of response Ai being given as the jth choice (j =1 or 2). Then P(A i ,11Sj) denotes the probab1l1ty that Ai is the first choice, given that the critical symbol is actually Sj' and P(Ak,21 Sj' Ai,l) denotes the probability that A k is the second choice, given that the critical symbol is Sj and the first choice is Ai' The class of high threshold models of interest here can be represented in a general way by assuming that on every trial there is a (fixed) probability 0 that the critical symbol will be detected; if detection occurs the S makes the correct response with probability 1. Otherwise, with probab1l1ty 1 -0 , the critical symbol is not detected and the S guesses, selecting response At with bias probab1l1ty Pi' Thus, Estes and Taylor (1964, 1966) , and Estes and Wessel (1966) describe a new method of determining visual apprehension span, and investigate several models designed to account for results obtained with this method. In simplest form the procedure in these experiments involves the tachistoscopic display of a set of letters, or other symbols, arranged in matrix form. Among the symbols in a given matrix there is exactly one belonging to a predesignated set of "critical" symbols; the S's task is to report which critical symbol has been presented. The design then is essentially that of a forced choice signal detection experiment. The models that have been studied in connection with these experiments have all been ''high threshold" models, in the sense that all assume that on any given trial the critical symbol is either perfectly recognized, in which case the S makes the correct response with probab1l1ty I, or else the critical symbol is not detected at all, in which case the S must guess. The designation "high threshold" is used here in the sense described by Swets, Tanner, and Birdsall (1961) .
The present study was designed to test a prediction common to all high threshold models: that second choices made following incorrect first responses .must be .at the chance level. Better than chance performance on second choices has been found in signal detection (SWets et al, 1961) , speech recognition (Clarke, 1960) , and in the recognition of tachistoscopically presented words (Bricker & Chapanis, 1960) . In view of these results it might be expected that .055
However, in pilot work it was found that although the high threshold model gave a good account of both first and second choice data, the estimated response biases did not satisfy Equation (6) 
METHOD
Procedure
A trial consisted of presenting one stimulus at a viewing distance of 48 in. via a SCientific Prototype Model GB tachistoscope. The pre-field on each trial was a white field (8.5 ft-L) containing a small fixation where~,Aj denotes the pair of available responses, and P"(i,j) a pairwise response bias probability similar to P(i,i) , although not necessarily numerically equal to the p(i,j) of Equations (3), (4), and (5). Interest in the two response trials centered on the question of whether P"(i,j) might not be predictable from Pi and Pj according to Luce's choice axiom, t.e., whether
Subjects
Four untrained Ss were obtained from an introductory psychology course. Each S was paid a base point. On a signal from the E the S initiated the stimulus display by means of a hand switch. The luminance of the white background of the letter matrix was 10.5 ft-L. The stimulus display was followed by a blank white field (8.5 ft-L) on which the fixation point reappeared after 3 sec. Each session consisted of 200 such trials and lasted about 1 h. Each S was run through ten 200-trial sessions. In Sessions 2 through 10 there were two types of trials. On three response (3R) trials, all three of the responses S, T, and U were available as possible first responses. If the S's first choice on a 3R trial was incorrect, he was so informed and required to make a second choice from the two remaining alternatives. If the first choice was correct no second response was required. On two response (2R) trials, the S was told, after the stimulus but before his response, that a certain one of the responses was not correct on that trial, and that he should therefore select his response from the two potentially correct responses. The S then made his choice from these two responses. On both 2R and 3R trials the correct response was always indicated to the S after his final choice. Figure 1 shows the various types of trials in Sessions 2-10 and their relative frequencies. Overall a random 67 percent of the trials in these sessions were 3R trials. Session 1 consisted entirely of 3R trials. In this session, the duration of the stimulus display was varied over trials to determine a value at which the S would be correct about half the time on 3R trials (Le., a 6 of .25). The duration setting obtained in this fashion was then used in the remaining sessions.
The perceptual task here was essentially that described in Estes and Taylor (1964) . The stimuli were 48 5 x 7 in. white cards, each containing a 4 by 4 array of 16 black decal letters (Paratype 36 pt., futura medium). Each stimulus consisted of 15 irrelevant consonants and one letter from the set of critical symbols 1S, T, U I. Each letter occupied a .5 x .5 in. cell of a 2 x 2 in. square field. Forty-eight stimuli were generated by letting each of the three critical letters appear once in each of the 16 possible cells. The three stimuli corresponding to a given position of the critical letter each had the same configuration of irrelevant letters in their remaining cells.
308 rate of one dollar per session, plus one cent for each correct first response on 3R trials, and one-half cent each for all other correct responses. The duration settings as determined in Session 1 were 3.3, 7.0, 4.9, and 4.6 msec for Ss 1, 2,3, and 4, respectively.
RESULTS
The St, Aij notation will be used in reporting results. The correspondence is~=S, S2=T, S3=U, Data from 2R and 3R trials were analyzed separately; the 3R trials will be considered first. Table 1 shows the first choice response probabilities for each S. The "observed" entries are the relative frequencies of each of the three responses as a function of the critical letter actually presented. The proportions shown are based on all nine experimental sessions; each row corresponds to an N of around 400. The high threshold model of Equations (1) and (2) was evaluated by estimating the parameters 6, P1' P2' and P3 for each S and then using these estimates to predict the first choice probabilities. These predicted values are shown in parentheses in Table 1 . Parameters were estimated jointly by the method of least squares. To determine goodness of fit a chi square statistic was computed using the observed and predicted absolute frequencies corresponding to Table 1 . Under a minimum chi square estimation procedure this statistic would have df = 3 (Cramer, 1946) ; the values here were 5.8, 4.9, 1.2, and 7.2 for Ss 1, 2, 3, and 4. None of these is significant at the .05 level (under the rather conservative assumption of df=3) so the high threshold model appears to given an adequate account of the first choice data. 2 The parameter estimates for each S are shown in Table 2 .
To evaluate the high threshold prediction of chance performance on second choices, the three pairs of second choice frequencies corresponding to Equations (3), (4), and (5) were subjected to chi square tests for equality of proportions. Each of the three equations corresponds to a chi square statistic with one 14 corresponded to a probability of being correct greater than .50, 10 to a probability less than .50. Overall, it appears that the second choices here were determined simply by chance guessing based on response biases, t.e., the second choices did not convey any significant information about the stimulus. To evaluate the relationship between Pi' Pj' and p(i,j) suggested by Luce's theory, the Pi estimates from the first choice data (Table 2) were used, via Equation (6), to predict p(i,j) values, and these in turn were used to predict second choice absolute frequencies. A comparison of these predicted values and the observed data indioated a generally unsatisfactory fit: The X 2 goodness of fit statistics (df =6) were 10.14, 61.95, 44.46, and 33.70 for Ss 1,2, 3, and 4, respectively. All but the first of these are significant at the .05 level. The observed pairwise probabilities are given in Table 3 , together with the values predicted by Equation (6) (shown in parentheses). Each "observed" entry is the overall proportion of times Ai was chosen over Aj on all second choices in which the pair {Ai' Aj f was available.
These proportions are based on Ns ranging from 123 to 314. It will be observed that there is no particularly striking correspondence between observed and predicted values here, except perhaps in the case of S 1. It appears that Luce's choice axiom does not, in general, correctly predict the relationship between first and second choice response biases.
Data from the 2R trials were first examined to determine whether the sensitivity parameter 0 had the same value on these trials as on the 3R trials. The estimated 0 values were .25, .20, .21, and .32 for Ss 1 through 4, respectively. (These estimates were based on the fact that the sum of the six error probabilities (Equation (8» generated by the 2R trials is equal to 3(1 -6).) A comparison with the estimates in Table 2 will show that the 6 estimates from 2R 309 trials are quite close to the corresponding estimates from the 3R trials.
The viability of the high threshold model for the 2R trials was tested first by estimating pairwise biases for these trials (using Equations (7) and (8» and then using these biases, together with the 0 estimates from 3R trials, to predict the various response probabilities on 2R trials. These predictions are shown in Table 4 (the ''h'' rows) together with the observed probabilities. For each S the table gives the observed and predicted probabilities of a correct response on each of the six types of 2R trials. The chi square values (df= 3) corresponding to these predictions are 0.86, 2.03, 8.28, and 0.96 for Ss 1, 2, 3, and 4. The value for S 3 is significant (p< .05), the rest are not.
To test the choice axiom prediction of Equation (9), Pi estimates from the 3R trials (Table 2 ) were used to predict p"'(i,j) values, and these predicted biases, together with 0 estimates from the 3R trials, were used (via Equations (7) and (8» to predict the 2R probabilities. These predictions are shown in the "a" rows of Table 4 . These predictions are generally quite satisfactory. The chi square goodness of fit values (df=6) were 25.26, 4.08, 12.29, and 6.87 for Ss 1, 2, 3, and 4. The first of these is significant (p< .05), the rest are not. It is worth noting that these predictions for the 2R data are based entirely on parameters estimated from the 3R trials, and Equations (6), (7), and (8); there is no overlap between the data used in estimating the parameters and the data being predicted. The overall goodness of fit across all four Ss is reflected in the average pairwise biases: The observed averages for P(1,2), P(1,3), and p(3,2) were .33, .43, and .46, while the averages of the corresponding predicted values were .37, .42, and .45.
DISCUSSION
This experiment shows, first of all, that under the conditions of the Estes-Taylor span of apprehension task second choices made following incorrect first responses convey little or no information about the stimulus; second choice behavior here can apparently be accounted for simply in terms of nondiscriminative response biases. This result is consistent with the class of high threshold or "all or none" models that have been proposed for this situation (Estes & Taylor, 1964 . Although none of the models suggested so far has been entirely satisfactory (Estes & Wessel, 1966) , the present study indicates that one need not abandon the assumption that the critical recognition process here is all or none. At first glance these results might seem to contradict Bricker and Chapanis' (1960) finding that second, and even later, choices in tachistoscopic word recognition are better than chance. However, Bricker and Chapanis specifically attributed their result to the possibility that a S could recognize some, but not all, of the letters in a word, fail to make a correct first choice, and still use the recognized letters to advantage in subsequent choices. In the present experiment, performance depended entirely on recognizing the single critical letter; any recognition of irrelevant letters in the display could not affect second choice performance. Consequently Bricker and Chapanis' results, as they interpret them, are not incompatible with chance second choice performance in the present experiment.
The fact that Luce's choice axiom (represented here by Equation (6» did not accurately predict second choice response biases is consistent with results obtained by Clarke (1960) in a speech recognition task. He found second choices to be somewhat better than chance, but was unable to account for the numerical values of second choice probabilities, either in terms of a threshold model, "an extension of the constant ratio rule" (Luce's choice axiom), or any signal detectability model. An adequate model relating first and second choice probabilities is still unavailable. However, it is possible to suggest an explanation of the fact that the choice axiom did, by and large, correctly predict the relationship between first choice biases on 2R and 3R trials, but at the same time failed to account for second choice biases. It is well established that response biases in many psychophysical tasks are not constant within a session, but vary from trial to trial according to the history of reinforcing events (Atkinson, Bower, & Crothers, 1965) . The present study was concerned only with accounting for the average values of the bias probabilities, on the assumption that the bias process is at least stochastically stationary. However, if there are trial to trial fluctuations in response bias, then when a response, say AI' is given incorrectly as a first choice on some trial n, its momentary bias probability Pl,n will tend to be higher than average, and the other bias probabilities (P2,n and P3,n in this case) will tend to be below their respective averages. It is these non-average values that then determine the second choices, perhaps according to the choice axiom: p(2,3) = P2,n P2,n +P3,n However, even if this relationship obtained we should not, in general, expect to be able to predict the average second choice probabilities correctly if we simply substitute estimates of (the averages of) P2 and P3 based on the first choices; these averages will not be estimates of the appropriate conditional probabilities. The 2R trials, on the other hand, are random samples of all trials, and consequently the average bias values over these trials will be equal to the average bias values on 3R first choices. Consequently we would expect 2R and 3R first choice biases to be predictable, one from the other, if the choice axiom holds, as it apparently does to a good approximation in this experiment.
If the argument given above is applicable to the present experiment, it should be possible to demonstrate that response biases did in fact fluctuate over trials. For this purpose the sequential probabilities P(Al,118l Al,l) and P(Al,llSJ. Ax,l) were computed for each S. The first quantity is the conditional probability of an Al first response (on 3R trials) given that the stimulus is an~' and that the first response on the previous trial was AI' (The previous trial may be either a 2R or 3R trial.) The second quantity is the conditional probability of an Al first response given an~stimulus and a non-AI (r.e., A2 or A 3) first response on the previous trial. If the bias probabilities were fluctuating gradually over trials, then we should expect to find that P(Al,ll 81 Al,l) is greater than P(Al,l!~Ax,l)' since the occurrence of Al on Trial n -1 would tend to imply an above average value of PIon Trial n, In fact, a substantial effect of this sort was found for 8s 3 and 4: The respective values of p(Al,ll~Al,l) and P(Al,ll~Ax,l) were .56 vs .44 for 83, and 53 vs .42 for 8 4. For sa 1 and 2, on the other hand, the two probabilities were virtually the same: .44 vs .46 for 8 I, and .27 vs .26 for 8 2. However, when the sequential probabilities p(Aj,,n I8j,n stt,n-l) were examined, 8 2 was found to show a very pronounced negative recency effect: When the critical letter on Trial n (a 3R trial) was the same one that had been Perception & Psychophysics, 1967, Vol. 2 (7) presented on Trial n -I, the overall probability of a correct response on Trial n was .38, as compared with a correct response probability of .46 when the stimulus on Trial n differed from that on Trial n -1. A detailed analysis of the sequential probabilities confirmed the significance of this negative recency effect. For 8 1 no significant sequential effects due to stimuli could be found.
In summary then, substantial sequential effects reflecting fluctuations in response bias could be demonstrated for Ss 2, 3, and 4, but not for 81. This pattern of results is consistent with the pattern of successes and failures found in attempting to predict the second choice probabilities. According to our interpretation the substitution of first choice Pi' Pj estimates into Equation (6) will result in successful prediction of second choice probabilities only if the trial by trial variance in the response biases is negligible. This condition was apparently satisfied only in the case of 8 1, and 8 1 was in fact the only observer for whom the observed second choice probabilities did not differ significantly from their predicted values.
